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Abstract
In this article we explore the prescriptive approach to language use in its relation 
to ideology, past and present. Before Saussure, prescriptivists formulated rules 
from an instrumental perspective, which saw formal language as a means to 
persuade, partly by borrowing authority from august sources. We can now see 
this view as an ideology, and by analysing the mental components of ideology 
further we argue that the modern prescriptive approach to language appeals to 
DKLHUDUFKLFDOYLHZRIVRFLHW\DQGKHQFHRIODQJXDJH7KLVYLHZLVLQFRQÀLFW
with the more recent ideology of equality, and contemporary processes of 
VWDQGDUGLVDWLRQQHHGWREHXQGHUVWRRGE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKLVFRQÀLFW:HDUJXHDW
the same time that modern ‘descriptive’ linguistics, by taking the standard as its 
model, risks contamination from prescriptivism.
Keywords
<Prescriptive> <Descriptive> <Ideology> <Standard language> <Variation>
Resumen
Este artículo analiza el enfoque prescriptivo sobre el uso del lenguaje en lo 
que respecta a su relación con la ideología, ayer y hoy. Antes de Saussure, 
los prescriptivistas formularon reglas desde una perspectiva instrumental, que 
consideraba el lenguaje formal como medio de persuadir, tomando prestada en 
parte 
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parte la autoridad de fuentes prestigiosas. Actualmente se puede tomar esta visión 
como una ideología, y mediante el análisis de los componentes mentales de la 
ideología sostenemos que el enfoque prescriptivo moderno sobre el lenguaje 
apela a una visión jerárquica de la sociedad, y por tanto, del lenguaje. Esta visión 
se opone a la más reciente ideología de la igualdad, por lo que los procesos 
DFWXDOHVGHHVWDQGDUL]DFLyQQHFHVLWDQHQWHQGHUVHFRQUHVSHFWRDHVWHFRQÀLFWR
Sostenemos también que, al tomar el estándar como modelo, la lingüística 
‘descriptiva’ moderna corre el riesgo de contaminarse del prescriptivismo.         
  Palabras clave
<Prescriptivo> <Descriptivo> <Ideología> <Lengua estándar> <Variación>
I. Introduction
Like any cultural phenomenon, language can be looked at from either 
a disinterested, neutral standpoint or from one in which analysis is combined 
ZLWKVXEMHFWLYHHYDOXDWLRQ,QOLQJXLVWLFVWKH¿UVWDSSURDFKLVDVVLJQHGWKHODEHO
‘descriptive’ while the second is referred to as ‘prescriptive’. The opposition 
between the two standpoints is an important one, casting long shadows both 
inside academia and in the wider community. Inside academia, the importance 
of the distinction can be gauged from even a cursory perusal of the popular 
linguistics textbooks. For example, Lyons (1981: 47–54) has eight pages under 
the slogan Linguistics is descriptive, not prescriptive, while Fromkin et al. 
(2010: 13) insist that the proper outcome of inquiry into language is a model that 
‘does not tell you how you should speak; [but one which] describes your basic 
linguistic knowledge’. In the wider community, the distinction intersects with a 
host of attitudes and behaviours that have to do with how society is structured 
and how power is apportioned.
 Among academics, the sharp awareness of the contrast between the 
descriptive and prescriptive approaches can be traced to the work of Saussure, 
who in his famous Coup d’oeil sur l’histoire de la linguistique characterizes 
prescriptive grammar (or, in his terms, simply la grammaire) in the following 
way:
_______________________________________________________________
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Cette étude, inaugurée par les Grecs, continuée principalement 
par les Français, est fondée sur la logique et dépourvue de toute 
YXHVFLHQWL¿TXHHWGpVLQWpUHVVpHVXUODODQJXHHOOHPrPHHOOHYLVH
uniquement à donner des règles pour distinguer les formes correctes 
GHVIRUPHVLQFRUUHFWHVF¶HVWXQHGLVFLSOLQHQRUPDWLYHIRUWpORLJQpH
de la pure observation et dont le point de vue est forcément étroit.1 
(Saussure, 1972: 13).
As the quotation implies, prescriptivism operates by reference to some 
approved model, be that at the level of pronunciation or syntactic structure, 
whereas descriptivism has no such point of reference. Within the prescriptive 
approach, therefore, intra-linguistic variation implies deviation from a norm, 
whereas from the descriptive perspective such variation is merely grist to the 
observer’s mill.
 In the present paper, we will argue that prescriptivism in its modern form 
is the expression of an ideology, one which is anchored both in human psychology 
and in a broader, hierarchical conception of how society should be organized. 
However, we will also suggest that in the historical context the normative stance 
embodied in the prescriptive approach was adopted above all for professional 
rather than ideological reasons. As regards the contemporary state of affairs, we 
motivate a perspective in which standardization and its implied crusade against 
variation is the most basic of all the so-called language ideologies, in the sense 
that it determines the overarching reference system by which speakers interpret 
and rationalize linguistic practice and its relationship to social structure.
 In addition, we address two phenomena that typically receive less 
attention in the literature, viz. anti-descriptivism and anti-prescriptivism. The 
latter is a fundamentally social force deriving from what we take to be the 
SULPDU\FXOWXUDOFRQÀLFWRI WKHPRGHUQHUDZKLFKSLWV WKHROGHUKLHUDUFKLFDO
conception of how society should be organized against the emergent modern 
orthodoxy that can broadly be designated by the label ‘egalitarianism’. In 
contrast, anti-descriptivism is more apparent in academic discourse, where the 
preoccupation with attaining so-called explanatory adequacy over and above 
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descriptive adequacy is all too often a pretext for reviving the arbitrary approach 
that was manifested by the prescriptive grammarians of bygone centuries.
II. A historical perspective on prescriptivism
The prescriptive approach appears to have been around for as long as 
humans have engaged in discourse about language. To linguists operating in 
the post-Saussurean context, the fact that this approach represented for many 
centuries the dominant mode of linguistic analysis is usually understood as 
EHLQJWKHVLGHHIIHFWRIDSUHPRGHUQXQVFLHQWL¿FPLQGVHW+RZHYHUZKLOHLWLV
true that at least some prescriptive linguists were infected with a quasi-religious 
belief in the need to safeguard language from ‘corruption’,2 a case can be made to 
the effect that the emergence and subsequent dominance (until relatively recent 
WLPHVRIWKHSUHVFULSWLYHSDUDGLJPUHÀHFWVWKHRULJLQDOO\LQVWUXPHQWDOIXQFWLRQ
of grammatical teaching as much as any commitment to a renegade ideology.
6RSKLVWLFDWHGOLQJXLVWLFDQDO\VLVVLJQL¿FDQWO\SUHGDWHVWKHHPHUJHQFHRI
the Roman republic, being traceable at least as far back as the Vedic grammarians 
of ancient India. In the western tradition, however, it is the Latin rhetoricians 
who represent the prototype of the ‘linguist-as-instructor’. According to Law 
(2003: 62), “the ultimate goal of Roman education – to turn out good orators – 
cast its shadow over the earlier stages of schooling, in that the grammar-teachers 
(grammatici) shaped their instruction to act as a preparation for rhetorical 
training”. Within this framework, to be considered useful, discourse on language 
had to offer something more than detached description. Just as the medical expert 
or the lawyer offers a service to their client, so the linguistic analyst had to be 
VHHQWRLPSDUWVRPHWKLQJWRWKHLUGLVFLSOHWKDWZRXOGEHRISURGXFWLYHEHQH¿W
to him in his career or progression through society. Within the rigid pedagogy 
of the Roman state, this ‘offer’ consisted fundamentally in an induction into 
both the practice of eloquent discourse and into the conceptual principles that 
underlay the maintenance of this practice.
Core elements of the latter are summarized by Quintilian, perhaps the 
most celebrated of all the professional commentators on the Latin language, in 
the following extract from the Institutio Oratoria:
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Est etiam sua loquentibus observatio, sua scribentibus. Sermo 
constat ratione vetustate auctoritate consuetudine. Rationem 
praestat praecipue analogia, nonnumquam etymologia. Vetera 
maiestas quaedam et, ut sic dixerim, religio commendat. Auctoritas 
ab oratoribus vel historicis peti solet [. . .] Consuetudo vero 
certissima loquendi magistra, utendumque plane sermone, ut 
nummo, cui publica forma est.3 (Inst. orat. I, vi. I–3)
 Reason, antiquity and authority are leitmotifs of prescriptive discourse 
and, as such, their presence in the above text is entirely unsurprising. On the other 
hand, Quintilian also appeals to usage (consuetudoZKLFKDW¿UVWVLJKWLPSOLHV
a more empirical, even descriptive perspective. However, when Quintilian later 
explains what he means by consuetudo, it is clear that he reserves for himself, 
DQGE\H[WHQVLRQJUDPPDULDQVJHQHUDOO\D¿OWHULQJRUµJDWHNHHSLQJ¶IXQFWLRQ
[. . .] in loquendo non si quid vitiose multis insederit pro regula 
sermonis accipiendum erit. Nam ut transeam quem ad modum 
vulgo imperiti loquantur, tota saepe theatra et omnem circi turbam 
exclamasse barbare scimus. Ergo consuetudinem sermonis vocabo 
consensum eruditorum, sicut vivendi consensum bonorum.4 (Inst. 
orat. I, vi. I4–15)
The foregoing extracts, like many others that can be cited from the ancient 
texts, undoubtedly betray an elitist attitude towards language use. However, 
WKLV FOHDUO\XQVFLHQWL¿F DSSURDFK LVPRVW SODXVLEO\ DWWULEXWHG WR WKH DQDO\VW¶V
awareness of the need to ascribe social utility to their work, rather than to an 
irrational outlook per se. By creating and nurturing the perception that there is 
a single legitimized way of engaging in linguistic practice, the analyst invests 
their own activity with functionality, but at the same time reinforces the myth 
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WKDW EHKLQG REVHUYDEOH XVDJH VWDQGV DQ HQGXULQJ UHL¿HG HQWLW\ WR ZKLFK IXOO
access is mediated by a guild of professional experts.
,Q WKH 6SDQLVKVSHDNLQJ ZRUOG WKH OHDGLQJ ¿JXUH RI WKH SUHVFULSWLYH
tradition is commonly thought to be Antonio Nebrija, the author of what appears 
WR EH WKH ¿UVW JUDPPDU RI D PRGHUQ (XURSHDQ ODQJXDJH 'HVSLWH WKH PDQ\
centuries separating the publication of Nebrija’s Gramática castellana (1492) 
from the period during which Quintilian was active, the preoccupation of both 
scholars with the teleology of linguistic analysis is quite striking. Indeed, in the 
prologue to the Gramática, Nebrija goes so far as to remind his patron, Queen 
Isabel of Castile, that she herself had initially been uncertain of the utility of the 
work:
[. . .] cuando en Salamanca di la muestra de aquesta obra a vuestra 
UHDOPDMHVWDGĲPHSUHJXQWRTXHSDUDTXHSRGLDDSURYHFKDU>@5 
(Gramática castellana Folio 3 r.)
While Quintilian’s teachings naturally derived their functionality from 
their relationship to the conventional career pathway of the Roman elite, Nebrija’s 
own work was conducted within a very different social context, in which 
linguistic analysis had no obvious material value. He thus had to improvise, 
diffusing the teleological issue raised by Isabel in Salamanca by presenting 
KLVJUDPPDUDVDQ LQVWUXPHQWRI WKH LPSHULDOHQWHUSULVHVSHFL¿FDOO\ZLWK WKH
suggestion (Folio 3 v.) that his text would enable the Spanish language to be 
taught to the vanquished enemies of the emergent Spanish state, as well as to all 
those nations (Basques, Navarrans, the French and Italians) who had ‘algun trato 
Ĳ conversacion en españa’ (‘some dealings or conversation in Spain’).
 Allied to the foregoing purpose was the notion that the deeds of the 
monarch needed a vehicle for their preservation (Folio 3 r.). In the following text 
Nebrija explicitly links the propitious political context with what he takes to be 
the state of near perfection that the Spanish language had achieved by the end of 
the 15th century, illustrating nicely the interaction between two of the principal 
33
On prescriptivism and ideology...
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
                                     
                                  
Vol. XI  - Nº 2           
concepts that underlie the normative approach, viz. instrumentality and the more 
abstract perspective according to which the grammarian becomes the guardian 
RIDVSHFL¿FTXDOLWDWLYHO\VXSHULRULQVWDQWLDWLRQRIWKHODQJXDJH
I sera necessaria una de dos cosas: o que la memoria de vuestras 
hazañas perezca con la lengua: o que ande peregrinando por las 
naciones estrangeras: pues que no tiene propia casa en que pueda 
PRUDU(Q OD oDQLDGHOD FXDO LR TXLVH HFKDU ODSULPHUDSLHGUD Ĳ
KD]HUHQQXHVWUDOHQJXDORTXH]HQRGRWRHQODJULHJDĲ&UDWHVHQ
la latina. Los cuales aun que fueron vencidos delos que despues 
GHOORVHVFULXLHURQDORPHQRVIXHDTXHOODVXJORULDĲVHUDQXHVWUD
que fuemos los primeros inuentores de obra tan necesaria. lo cual 
hezimos enel tiempo mas oportuno que nunca fue hasta aqui. por 
estar ia nuestra lengua tanto en la cumbre que mas se puede temer el 
decendimento della: que esperar la subida.6 (Gramática castellana 
Folio 3 r.) 
$ ¿QDO MXVWL¿FDWLRQ IRU 1HEULMD¶V DQDO\WLFDO HQWHUSULVH ZDV WKDW KLV
Gramática would assist in the acquisition of Latin, presumably in the sense 
that, by learning how to analyse their own language, Spanish speakers would 
EHFRPH PRUH DGHSW DW ¿QHVVLQJ WKH PRUH LQWULFDWH OLQJXLVWLF SUREOHPV SRVHG
by the classical tongue. From one point of view, this rationalization is simply a 
further illustration of the need felt by the pre-modern analyst to invest their work 
with functionality. But it is also emblematic of the close relationship that was 
felt to exist between the subject matter addressed by the rhetoricians of antiquity 
and the grammarians of the early modern period, a belief which in one form or 
another persists to the present day.
7R VXPPDUL]H VR IDU WKH DSSDUHQWO\ DUELWUDU\ DQG QRQVFLHQWL¿F
dimension to the prescriptive mindset can, in part at least, be regarded as a by-
34
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product of the need felt by the early pioneers of linguistic analysis to invest their 
work with functionality.7 In western Europe, the prototype for this ‘analyst as 
gate-keeper’ is the Roman rhetorician, whose job was to assist young men in 
their advancement through the various levels of Roman society. An analogous 
LQVWUXPHQWDOLW\ LV DSSDUHQW DW WKH RXWVHW RI WKH PRGHUQ HUD LQ WKH ¿UVW RI WKH
grammars of the modern languages, Nebrija’s Gramática castellana, although 
here the grammarian subordinates his work not to the professional advancement 
of individual members of the elite, but to that most prototypical construct of the 
late Renaissance, the building of the nation state.
 With the rise of the bourgeoisie across Europe, prescriptive linguists 
discovered arguably their most enduring market, in the sense that the emergent 
professional classes together with the ‘new nobility’ represented a growing pool 
of individuals with a natural instinct for linguistic self-improvement. The most 
HPEOHPDWLFRI WKH OLQJXLVWVZKRÀRXULVKHGLQ WKLVHQYLURQPHQWZDV WKHWK
century French grammarian Vaugelas, whose stated aim was to “condamner tout 
FHTXLQ¶HǕWSDVGXERQRXGXEHO9ǕDJH´8 (Vaugelas 1663: Préface, VII, 1). 
Vaugelas cleverly exploited the social trends of his time and in so doing 
achieved a lasting authority (see Ayres-Bennett, 1993: 35–37).9 On the one hand, 
KH H[SOLFLWO\ DGRSWHG FRXUW XVDJH DV KLV OLQJXLVWLF PRGHO E\ GH¿QLQJ le bon 
usage DVµODIDoRQGHSDUOHUGHODSOXVǕDLQHSDUWLHGHOD&RXU¶10 (Vaugelas, 1663: 
Préface, II, 3), a stratagem which coincided with the centralizing tendencies of 
WKHDJHDQGVSHFL¿FDOO\WKHFRQVROLGDWLRQRIDQDEVROXWHPRQDUFK\6HFRQGO\
Vaugelas’s avowed objective of promoting clarity and purity dovetailed perfectly 
with the objectives of the newly founded Académie Française. Third, he found a 
ready audience among the newly created nobility, who were anxious to assimilate 
themselves to the mores of the traditional nobility, in language as in behaviour 
DQGGUHVV$QG¿QDOO\KLVZRUNVDWLV¿HGZKDWZDVIHOWWREHDJHQXLQHOLQJXLVWLF
QHHG'HPDQGVIRUDFRGL¿FDWLRQDQGVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQRIXVDJHKDGEHHQPDGH
from the early 16th century and, by promoting unambiguously a particular model 
of usage (that of the royal court), Vaugelas effectively addressed this issue. 
Analogously to Nebrija, then, Vaugelas can be seen primarily as a professional, 
tailoring his approach to the demands of the time and delivering prescription 
because that, in an important sense, was what the market was calling for.
 We complete this succinct historical conspectus of prescriptive thinking 
with a brief look at Andrés Bellos’s Gramática de la lengua castellana destinada 
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al uso de los Americanos (Santiago de Chile, 1847). This is in some ways a 
paradoxical work, given the author’s avowed intention to avoid falling into 
the trap of blindly promoting Peninsular Spanish usage at the expense of Latin 
American usage: “No se crea que [. . .] sea mi ánimo tachar de vicioso y espurio 
todo lo que es peculiar de los americanos”11 (Bello 1984: 33). For despite this 
apparent readiness to observe rather than criticize internal variation within 
Spanish, Bello still insists on the normative status of the grammatical system 
WKDWKHGHVFULEHV,QGHHGWKH¿UVWWZRRIKLVNociones preliminares could easily 
have been written by Quintilian or Nebrija:
1. La GRAMÁTICA de una lengua es el arte de hablar correctamente, 
esto es, conforme al buen uso, que es el de la gente educada.
 6H SUH¿HUH HVWH XVR SRUTXH HV HO PiV XQLIRUPH HQ ODV YDULDV
provincias y pueblos que hablan una misma lengua [. . .] al paso que 
las frases y palabras de la gente ignorante varían mucho de unos 
pueblos y provincias a otros, y no son fácilmente entendidas fuera 
de aquel estrecho recinto en que las usa el vulgo.12 (Bello, 1984: 35)
As with the efforts of the earlier Spanish and Hispano-Latin analysts, 
however, the prescriptivism in Bello’s approach does not arise ex nihilo but 
stems rather from a more fundamental concern with the teleology of grammatical 
analysis. In this regard, Bello is very explicit indeed, stating (ibid. p. 33) that his 
principal reason for composing his grammar was to prevent Spanish suffering 
the fate of Latin in post-imperial Europe:
Pero el mayor mal de todos, y el que, si no se ataja, va a privarnos 
de las inapreciables ventajas de un lenguaje común, es la avenida 
de neologismos de construcción, que inunda y enturbia mucha parte 
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de lo que se escribe en América, y alterando la estructura del idio
ma, tiende a convertirlo en una multitud de dialectos irregulares, 
OLFHQFLRVRVEiUEDURVHPEULRQHVGH LGLRPDV IXWXURVTXHGXUDQWH
una larga elaboración reproducirán en América lo que fué la Euro
pa en el tenebroso período de la corrupción del latín [. . .] Sea que 
yo exagere o no el peligro, él ha sido el principal motivo que me ha 
inducido a componer esta obra [. . .]13
  
 Quintilian, Nebrija, Vaugelas and Bello wrote at very different times 
IURP RQH DQRWKHU DQG VXSHU¿FLDOO\ WKHLU PRWLYHV IRU HQJDJLQJ LQ OLQJXLVWLF
analysis were diverse. In a very fundamental sense, however, they are remarkably 
similar in that their analytic output is subservient to a greater objective. Thus 
their condemnation, implicit or explicit, of intra-linguistic variation is not itself 
programmatic, an irrational manifestation of snobbery or academic prejudice, 
but rather it is a wholly predictable consequence of the need for linguists to 
rationalize or justify their activity in historical eras in which synchronic 
linguistics did not exist as a science in its own right.
III. Descriptivism and anti-descriptivism
7KH SXWWLQJ RI OLQJXLVWLFV RQ D SURSHU VFLHQWL¿F IRRWLQJ ZDV LQ IDFW
achieved only with the advent of Saussure. In his Cours de linguistique générale, 
6DXVVXUH LGHQWL¿HV WKH WZRPDMRU WDVNVRI OLQJXLVWLFV DVEHLQJ L µGH IDLUH OD
description et l’histoire de toutes les langues qu’elle pourrait atteindre’14 and (ii) 
‘de chercher les forces qui sont en jeu d’une manière permanente et universelle 
dans toutes les langues’15 (Saussure, 1972: 20). In addition to highlighting the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIGLDFKURQLFUHVHDUFKWKH¿UVWRIWKHVHREMHFWLYHVHIIHFWLYHO\GH¿QHV
the working space of descriptive linguistics. And in this regard, Saussure was 
clear that linguistic description should not abstain from capturing all aspects of 
language, including forms that under the prescriptive approach would count as 
deviations from the agreed norm:
37
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La matière de la linguistique est constituée d’abord par toutes les 
manifestations du langage humain [. . .] en tenant compte, dans 
chaque période, non seulement du langage correct et du <<beau 
langage>>, mais de toutes les formes d’expression.16 (Saussure, 
1972: 20)
 
,I WKH ¿UVW WDVN RI OLQJXLVWLFV DFFRUGLQJ WR 6DXVVXUH ZDV HVVHQWLDOO\
empirical, the second was clearly theoretical and in Saussure’s formulation 
(chercher les forces qui sont en jeu d’une manière permanente et universelle) 
we can already detect a concern with the universal apparatus of language that 
would be rebranded by Chomsky as Universal Grammar. In principle, detached 
linguistic description and the search for the universal principles of language are 
natural allies, the one providing the raw data for the other. Arguably, however, 
while cloaking themselves in the trappings of the hypothetico-deductive method, 
linguists in the 20th and 21st centuries have not managed to fully escape from 
the arbitrary rejection of variation that characterized the overtly prescriptive 
discourse of the pre-Saussurean age.
 Since the Chomskyan revolution of the mid- to late 20th century, 
linguistic analysis has become avowedly mentalistic. With this development, 
the object of study, Saussure’s matière de la linguistique, has undergone a subtle 
transformation, overt description becoming progressively crowded out by the 
need to map the structure of a psychological entity which Chomsky (1986) 
refers to as the ‘I-language’ (where ‘I’ stands for ‘internal’ or ‘intensional’). 
In this newer approach, two axiomatic beliefs conspire to render the paradigm 
broadly anti-descriptivist in nature. Firstly there is the assumption that theoretical 
conclusions about language structure can only be drawn if intra-linguistic 
variation is disregarded. As Chomsky (1965: 3) himself put it, ‘[l]inguistic 
theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker–listener, in a completely 
homogeneous speech community’. Such a speaker does not of course exist, nor 
does the relevant speech community, and to the extent that these constructs are 
not naturally given, the linguist is obliged to reconstruct them using his or her 
own judgment, much as the prescriptive grammarians of bygone centuries took 
it upon themselves to rule on matters of correct usage.
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The second assumption that militates against a truly descriptive approach 
LV WKH EHOLHI WKDW WKH HYLGHQFH SURYLGHG E\ LQGLYLGXDO VSHDNHUV LV FRQ¿JXUHG
in a hierarchy of reliability, the opinion of some speakers implicitly being 
considered less important than that of others. Once again Chomsky can be seen 
as legitimizing this perspective, suggesting, for example, that it is merely a 
‘pretence’ to claim that informant judgments ‘give us “direct evidence” as to the 
structure of the I-language’ (Chomsky 1986: 36). While there is obviously a case 
for screening linguistic data in order to weed out the excrescences of language 
pedagogy, an approach that generally assumes fallibility among speakers in 
practice empowers linguists to ignore variation and to privilege what is in effect 
a modern form of the consensum eruditorum by which Quintilian lay such 
store. In this regard the quotation below from the prominent French syntactician 
Nicholas Ruwet is revealing.
la grammaire générative, abordant des problèmes de plus en plus 
complexes et délicats, recourt de plus en plus à des jugements très 
subtils, sur lesquels les sujets hésitent, se contredisent, etc. Le risque 
d’arbitraire devient grand. Autrement dit, et surtout quand les pro
EOqPHVpWXGLpVVHVLWXHQWDX[FRQ¿QVGHODV\QWD[HHWGHODVpPDQWL
TXHYRLUHGHODSUDJPDWLTXHOHVMXJHPHQWVEUXWVQHVLJQL¿HQWSOXV
JUDQGFKRVH LOV H[LJHQW G¶rWUH LQWHUSUpWpV >  @ 8QH TXHVWLRQ VH
SRVHSHXWrWUHTXHQRVOLQJXLVWHVERQVGpPRFUDWHVSUpIqUHQWODLV
VHUGHF{Wp\DXUDLWWLOGHVGHJUpVGDQVODFRPSpWHQFHOLQJXLVWLTXH"
&HUWDLQV VXMHWVSDUODQWV VHUDLHQWLOVSOXVGRXpVTXHG¶DXWUHVSRXU
H[SORLWHUOHVSRVVLELOLWpVODWHQWHVGDQVOHV\VWqPH">@ODWUDGLWLRQ
JUDPPDWLFDOHQ¶DYDLWSHXWrWUHSDVWRXWjIDLWWRUWGHSULYLOpJLHUOHV
grands écrivains.175XZHWFLWHG9HODQG
The key issue here is that the judgments (and by extension the linguistic 
behaviour) of individual speakers are claimed to require interpretation by the 
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linguist. But to what criteria can the latter appeal, other than to his or her own 
intuition, which in almost all cases will have been moulded by the invariant 
standard variety of the language that is used in schools and universities? Thus 
DOWKRXJKWKHPRGHUQDSSDUHQWO\VFLHQWL¿FDQDO\VWQRORQJHUWDONVRIµDXWKRULW\¶
RU µFRUUHFWQHVV¶ LW LV GLI¿FXOW LQ SUDFWLFH WR VHH KRZ YDULDWLRQ IDUHV EHWWHU LQ
the modern paradigm of theoretical linguistics than it did under the overtly 
prescriptive regimes of the pre-Saussurean era. According to Radford (1988: 10), 
a leading vulgarizer of the Chomskyan paradigm, variation can be dismissed as 
falling within the purview of sociolinguistics, with the following (remarkable) 
result:
For practical purposes, most linguists describing a language of 
which they are native speakers rely on their own intuitions, and 
thus the grammar they devise is essentially a grammar of their own 
idiolect, which they assume is representative of the language as a 
whole.
With unintended accuracy, the above quotation encapsulates perfectly 
how easy it is for arbitrary assumptions to be mistaken for linguistic description. 
As part of this, we can note that the linguist’s readiness to take his or her own 
idiolect as representative of the language as a whole is of a piece with what 
Joseph (1987: 2) calls the ‘synecdochic’ status of the standard language, whereby 
a single invariant grammar comes to stand in place of the myriad varieties that 
actually constitute the language in question.18
IV. The ideological dimension
So far we have looked at instrumental or professional motivations for 
adopting a prescriptive approach. However, one of the major artefacts of the 
SUHVFULSWLYHHQWHUSULVHLVWKHFUHDWLRQRIWKHWKHRUHWLFDOO\XQLIRUPDQG¿[HGHQWLW\
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known as the standard language. In their role as guardians of this construct, the 
work of prescriptivists acquires an overtly ideological character, for example in the 
attempt to repel linguistic invaders of working-class origin from “contaminating” 
the standard language. Both the fact that such an enterprise is actually pursued 
and the fact that is doomed to failure are fundamental components of what might 
be termed the contemporary sociolinguistic dynamic, as we discuss in more 
GHWDLOEHORZ$WWKLVSRLQWLWVXI¿FHVWRREVHUYHWKDWVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQLVSHUSHWXDOO\
¿JKWLQJDUHDUJXDUGEDWWOHDJDLQVWODQJXDJHFKDQJHDQGIURPWKLVSRLQWRIYLHZ
WKHSURFHVVPD\EHVHHQDVDFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQWZRRSSRVLQJLGHRORJLHV
 The term ‘ideology’ is itself not unproblematic, despite its widespread 
use in academic discourse since at least the latter half of the 20th century. The 
FRPSOH[LW\RIWKHLVVXHLVLOOXVWUDWHGE\WKHOHQJWKRIWKHOLVWRIGH¿QLWLRQVRI
the concept given by Eagleton (1992), even if several of the sixteen senses of 
LGHRORJ\KHOLVWVDUHIDLUO\FORVHO\UHODWHG2QHFDQGH¿QHDQLGHRORJ\LQDQHXWUDO
way by suggesting that it takes a partial or biased view of the social world, in 
order to make sense of it. In addition, a common, pejorative understanding of 
an ideology is of a world-view that helps to legitimize and maintain a set of 
SRZHUUHODWLRQV1RUDUHWKHVHGH¿QLWLRQVPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYH$VZHDUHREOLJHG
to impose patterns upon the data that bombard us, an ideology helps to make 
a situation intelligible and, in an analogous way, people tend to rationalize or 
justify their behaviour by reference to a system of beliefs. In the spirit of Balkin 
(1998: 1–3), understanding an ideology can be viewed as a procedure whereby 
the ideology is broken down ‘into its variegated mechanisms’, the latter being 
no more than ‘special cases of the ordinary processes and operations of human 
thought’, such as protection of the ego and the tendency to think metaphorically 
or metonymically.
A sense of the relationship between brute human psychology and 
ideology underpins Eagleton’s quip (1991: 2) that ideology is ‘what the other 
person has’, which captures the undoubted truth that individuals tend strongly to 
regard their own world-view as objective or neutral, and indeed may not notice 
it, while perceiving bias in that of others.19 Moreover, the preference for one’s 
own point of view may be allied to a more fundamental human trait. As Hobbes 
expressed the matter long ago, ‘such is the nature of men, that howsoever they 
may acknowledge many others to be more witty or more eloquent or more 
learned, yet they will hardly believe that there be any so wise as themselves, 
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for they see their own wit at hand and other men’s at a distance’ (Leviathan, 
chapter 13). In this perspective ideology is the expression, on the one hand of a 
fairly innocuous kind of egotism that is fundamental to human nature, and on the 
other of individual temperament. This then is one of the ‘ordinary processes and 
operations of human thought’.
 A further crucial point, obvious enough but worth stating because central 
to our investigation, is that ideologies are normative; they propose a view of the 
world, or an aspect of the world, as it should be. Even ostensibly non-normative 
ideologies, like religions having the aim of seeing things objectively, lay a charge 
upon their adherents to follow a pattern of behaviour. The normative character 
of ideologies appears to be underpinned by a more basic psychological trait; 
what Dennett (2006: 109–114) calls the ‘intentional stance’.
The essential concept is not new; Dennett cites Hume (1777) to the effect 
WKDWµZH¿QGKXPDQIDFHVLQWKHPRRQDUPLHVLQWKHFORXGVDQGE\DQDWXUDO
SURSHQVLW\ LI QRW FRUUHFWHG E\ H[SHULHQFH DQG UHÀHFWLRQ DVFULEH PDOLFH DQG
good-will to every thing, that hurts or pleases us’. In other words, we attribute 
intentionality to persons, animals, conceptual systems like ideologies and even 
things. Our response is normative where the perceived intention contradicts our 
preferred viewpoint. Dennett suggests that this tendency may be biologically 
adaptive. In the context of evolutionary psychology, it seems likely that survival 
strategies designed to promote reproduction, foraging and defence against 
predators will be enhanced by an intentional stance, or what is sometimes called 
a ‘theory of mind’. As Dennett points out, the latter term is unsuitable in the 
measure that our conjectures about other minds are generally intuitive and not 
best described as consciously framed ‘theories’.
7KH LQWHQWLRQDO VWDQFH KDV IDUUHDFKLQJ FRQVHTXHQFHV 1R UHÀHFWLRQ
is needed to see that things can have no intentions, even if we retain a naive 
stratum in our psychology that holds this vestigial view, but a little more is 
required to realize that intentionality is also ruled out of conceptual systems 
and their cultural expression. This is simply because they are too complex, and 
here Balkin’s analytical approach, which highlights among other things the 
relationship between ideology and the ability to think metonymically, comes 
into its own. For there appears to be a widely shared tendency to see intention 
H[HPSOL¿HG PHWRQ\PLFDOO\ LQ WKH PDQLIHVWDWLRQV RI DQ LGHRORJ\$SSOLHG WR
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OLQJXLVWLFSUDFWLFHWKLVPHDQVLGHRORJ\DVLW¿QGVH[SUHVVLRQLQYDULDEOHODQJXDJH
Speakers most likely have no conscious awareness that they are expressing an 
ideology when they speak, while they appear in contrast capable of identifying 
LWRUSURMHFWLQJLWLQWKHLUUROHDVKHDUHUV7KHFODVVLFVRFLROLQJXLVWLF¿QGLQJV
RI/DERYRQVHOIDQGRWKHUUHSRUWLQJDSSHDUWRLQVWDQWLDWHWKLVFRQÀLFW
Among other things, Labov’s study revealed that speakers having the most non-
standard pronunciation tended to judge other, similar speakers most severely 
in terms of the ideological beliefs associated with Standard English. What 
this seems to show is that a sample of speakers in New York City in the early 
1960s had internalized the standard ideology, but that this was at odds with 
their everyday social practice, as constrained no doubt by the local network 
in which their social practices took place. The overt normativity reported by 
Labov, which appears to be typical of standard language cultures generally, can 
be analysed as a response to the expression of competing ideologies, the (from 
the informant’s viewpoint) antithetical manifestation becoming imbued with 
intentionality through the above-mentioned process of metonymy.
 Turning now to the standard language itself, a common view holds that 
standardization is but one of several language ideologies. Under Silversteins’s 
GH¿QLWLRQVXFKLGHRORJLHVFRPSULVH³VHWVRIEHOLHIVDERXWODQJXDJH
DUWLFXODWHGE\XVHUVDVD UDWLRQDOLVDWLRQRU MXVWL¿FDWLRQRISHUFHLYHG ODQJXDJH
structure and use”. And for L. Milroy (2003: 161), “language ideologies may be 
viewed as a system for making sense of the indexicality inherent in language, 
given that languages and language forms index speakers’ social identities fairly 
reliably in communities”. Given the foregoing remarks about the relationship 
between ideology and the ordinary processes of human thought, the key terms 
LQ WKH WZR TXRWDWLRQV DUH µUDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ¶ µMXVWL¿FDWLRQ¶ DQG µPDNLQJ VHQVH¶
Beyond this, however, standardization (together with its obverse, anti-prescrip-
tivism, which we discuss in Section V) can perhaps be seen as the expression 
RIDEURDGHUFRQÀLFWZKLFKSLWVDKLHUDUFKLFDOYLHZRIKRZVRFLHW\VKRXOGEH
ordered against an egalitarian one. From that perspective, the sets of beliefs allu-
GHGWRLQ6LOYHUVWHLQ¶VGH¿QLWLRQFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVµVHFRQGRUGHU¶LGHRORJLHV
the primary dynamic being that the standard draws prestige from the power of 
its users. Similarly, it seems likely that hearers make ‘sense of the indexicality 
inherent in language’ by using their knowledge of how dialect maps on to social 
structure, a process which, in the modern era at least, implicitly references the 
standard variety of the relevant language, together with its cultural moorings. 
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This obviously raises the question of what the standard language itself 
indexes. In this regard, attitudes towards Standard French can serve as a useful 
guide, given that French is one of the languages that has been most subject 
WRSUHVFULSWLYHLQÀXHQFH/RGJHOLVWVWKHEHOLHIVFXUUHQWLQ)UDQFH
about the standard language as threefold: the ideal state of the language is one 
of uniformity; the most valid form of the language is to be found in writing; 
the standard is inherently better than the non-standard varieties (more elegant, 
clearer, etc.). If we take these three beliefs as a convenient starting point, and 
as widespread across cultures having standard languages, we see that they are 
not all of equal interest. Nor is it possible to separate them clearly in every case. 
$IXUWKHUTXDOL¿FDWLRQLVWKDWMXGJPHQWVRIGLIIHUHQWW\SHVWHQGWREHDSSOLHGWR
the three linguistic levels of analysis: speech often attracts aesthetic judgements, 
grammar tends to be vulnerable to pseudo-logical arguments, while lexis, as we 
shall see, is above all subject to the o tempora, o mores state of mind.
Uniformity
Regarding the widespread negative perception of language change, Labov 
remarks (2001: 6): “some older citizens welcome the new music and dances, the 
new electronic devices and computers. But no one has ever been heard to say: 
‘It’s wonderful the way young people talk today. It’s so much better than the way 
we talked when I was a kid’”. This is quite an effective piece of rhetoric, but like 
much rhetoric it achieves its effect by presenting a rather misleading selection of 
the pertinent facts. Older people may well react favourably to new technology, 
but one can question whether products like these have as much indexical value 
as changes affecting and expressing social identity: speech, clothing, political 
views and cultural attitudes more generally. Older speakers are notoriously 
more conservative, both culturally and politically. While the latest smart phone 
or watch functions no doubt as a fashion accessory and status symbol, new 
technology is also practically useful in a way that indexical language is not.
 The desire for uniformity in language manifests itself as resistance to 
variation and change, in speech and in writing. Are the motivations similar in 
each case? Speech and writing differ, quite manifestly, in that criticism directed 
against speech will often focus on accent features, and these can provoke 
curious reactions. In countries like the UK where there is an interaction between 
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social and regional variation, such that the traditional situation is that working-
class speakers have a localised accent and middle-class speakers much less so, 
dialect perception surveys have shown a tendency by respondents to attribute 
to accents certain personal qualities, like intelligence, honesty and friendliness. 
This is typically expressed in terms like ‘many respondents judge a Scottish 
accent to be honest’. Clearly, there is metonymic thinking at work here, since 
the proposition that ‘a Scottish accent is honest’ means little unless one accepts 
it is shorthand for something like ‘a speaker with a Scottish accent embodies for 
many respondents a stereotype that portrays the Scots as honest people’. This is 
LWVHOIRIFRXUVHDPRVWGXELRXVSURSRVLWLRQEXWLWLVFOHDUHQRXJKWKDW¿QGLQJV
like these are framed by the researchers who devise the questionnaires, and that 
the questions are framed in a more abstract way by the set of stereotypes that 
prevail in a given community.
A more straightforward example relates to the labels commonly applied 
in the perceptual literature to speakers of upper-class accents; these often rate 
as educated and intelligent, but also as remote and aloof. Here again metonymy 
is at work in seeing a representative of a certain ‘social class’ as embodying the 
stereotypical attributes of that class; it appears that we are more at ease with the 
personal than the impersonal, the concrete than the abstract. Quotation marks 
were used above because it is plain that social class is a conceptual organisation 
of the reality of inequality (Cannadine, 1998: 188), although like many concepts 
LWXQGHUJRHVZLGHVSUHDGUHL¿FDWLRQµPRXOGLQJRXUSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHXQHTXDO
social world’. Class is therefore a conveniently discrete, one-dimensional way 
of organising multi-dimensional reality, which encompasses inequality in 
many directions. Indeed, the concept of class is so schematic that it is allied to 
metaphorical thinking. 
The primacy and beauty of the standard
7KHVHFRQGHOHPHQWRIWKHVWDQGDUGODQJXDJHLQ/RGJH¶VFODVVL¿FDWLRQ
WKDW VHHV WKH PRVW YDOLG IRUP RI WKH ODQJXDJH LQ ZULWLQJ UHÀHFWV SHUKDSV D
perception that planned language is preferable to unplanned, accompanied 
of course by a failure to recognise that the one cannot fairly be compared to 
the other. The result is a tendency to judge speech by the criteria applicable to 
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writing, and this ignores the fact that relatively few people are capable, without a 
script, of producing speech that transcribed would read like carefully composed 
prose. Newsreaders and broadcast journalists, who according to a perceptual 
study of French (Castellotti and Robillard, 2003) are judged as ‘iconic speakers’ 
PRUHVWULQJHQWO\WKDQRWKHUSURIHVVLRQDOVSHDNHUVOLNHWHDFKHUV¿QGWKHPVHOYHV
criticised for betraying the standard, not only through their use of regionalisms 
but by producing false starts, hesitations and other characteristic features of 
spontaneous speech.
 The fact that written language can be planned and polished means that an 
author is able to achieve effects that are harder to bring off in speech, and that a 
UHDGHUFDQDSSUHFLDWHWKHVHDWOHLVXUH,WLVDOVRRIFRXUVHSRVVLEOHWR¿[ZULWLQJ
WRVRPHH[WHQW6RPXFKLVIDLUO\REYLRXVEXWWKHWKLUGRIWKHHOHPHQWVLGHQWL¿HG
by Lodge, the inherent beauty, logicality, etc., of the standard, is based on a 
surprisingly elementary misconception that is allied to the mismatch between 
speech and writing. The assessment of the standard as inherently better than 
DVVRFLDWHGQRQVWDQGDUGGLDOHFWV¿QGVH[SUHVVLRQLQYDULRXVRYHUODSSLQJZD\V
the standard can be thought of as more beautiful; as more suitable for literary 
expression; as better adapted to conveying abstraction; or, in a functional view, 
as a useful lingua franca.
 The view that sees the standard as the most suitable literary medium is 
partly based, as has often been pointed out, on the confusion between medium 
and use. In this argument we can discard the postmodern view that refuses to 
recognise any literary canon, and suggest that some writers are simply more 
successful than others in their use of standard speech or writing to achieve 
the effects they wish to bring off. Since aesthetic judgments are notoriously 
subjective, the point can be better illustrated by reference to the view, still 
prevalent in France, that the French language is characterised by logic and 
FODULW\ DV VXPPDULVHG LQ$QWRLQH GH 5LYDURO¶V ZHOONQRZQ WDJ ³FH TXL Q¶HǕW
SDVFODLUQ¶HǕWSDVIUDQoDLV´20 (Rivarol, 1784: 49). As Lodge points out (1998: 
23–31), the corollary of this belief is that the structure of French is somehow 
closer to the ‘language of thought’ or ‘mentalese’ than that of other languages, a 
view which Rivarol in fact embraced, as he completes the above quotation with 
WKHVWDWHPHQWWKDW³FHTXLQ¶HǕWSDVFODLUHǕWHQFRUHDQJODLVLWDOLHQJUHFRXODWLQ´
(ibid.).21
 As regards the claim that the standard language is a useful lingua franca, 
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a variety that all members of a speech community can be expected to understand 
if not produce, this seems ideologically neutral but can be related to what Joseph 
(1987: 2) calls the standard’s ‘synecdochic’ status, to which we referred at the 
end of Section III. The image corresponds with reality in that it conveys what 
Haugen (1972) calls the standard’s ‘elaboration of function’, which dictates that 
it should be capable of functioning as a means of expression in a wide range of 
domains, and indeed the history of standardization shows the encroachment of 
the standard into most if not all areas of public activity. This occurs, clearly, to 
the detriment of the other varieties. While it seems likely that the standard now 
functions in this way, at least as a comprehensible spoken variety, this state of 
affairs is in fact a recent one. A tantalising glimpse into the time before mass 
spoken media is provided by Green (1940: 238), when writing of the 1920s and 
30s in the UK: “at the time I went [to Birmingham] when hardly anyone had 
more than a crystal set, the announcers of the BBC had not got going with their 
BBC English so that I sometimes had trouble to make my accent understood 
or to understand theirs”. Green (1905–1973) had a privileged upbringing, and 
one can assume that his accent was what is now called (hyperlectal) Received 
Pronunciation. Whether the standard functions as an effective lingua franca 
in writing is a much more problematic question. Recent attempts in several 
FRXQWULHVWRPDNHRI¿FLDOODQJXDJHOHVVDEVWUDFWDQG/DWLQDWHVXJJHVWWKDWRQ
the contrary, the written standard erects a barrier to comprehension for many 
readers.
7KRVHZKRVHHNWRSUHVHQWWKHVWDQGDUGDVWKHPRVWHI¿FLHQWYDULHW\IRU
communicative purposes might also be charged with pursuing a ‘naturalizing’ 
agenda, where naturalization is understood as the process through which a 
hegemonic state of affairs comes to be seen as being rational, or dictated by 
common sense, or objective. Such arguments carry considerable potency, both 
LQVRFLHW\DWODUJHDQGZLWKLQWKHHGXFDWLRQV\VWHP+RZHYHULWLVQRWGLI¿FXOWWR
demonstrate that a common-sense standpoint is in fact a loaded one. For instance, 
earlier views that saw certain social groups as irremediably inferior are now 
largely superseded, but these were accepted at the time as rational views. The 
common-sense view in this argument is simply one that is commonly accepted 
and hence the argument itself is an instance of petitio principii.
So far we have considered resistance to regional forms – variation in 
space and, where relevant, in social origin. However, it is resistance to age-
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UHODWHGYDULDWLRQHVSHFLDOO\LQOH[LVWKDWUHSUHVHQWVDFRQÀXHQFHRIWKHYDULRXV
LGHRORJLFDOHOHPHQWVZHKDYHEHHQGLVFXVVLQJ$VLQJOHH[DPSOHVXI¿FHVDWWKLV
point. Amis’s (1997) guide to English usage, whose title The King’s English 
consciously echoes that of Fowler’s work, is unsystematic (its organisation 
is alphabetical) and many of its entries are discursive without offering any 
prescription; indeed, like much of Fowler, the work is for the most part tolerant 
and rational. The commonest theme is that clear communication should override 
all other considerations, but here and there nostalgia for the past, with all that that 
implies, is expressed in no uncertain terms, as in the following discussion (p. 57) 
RIWKHSKUDVHµHNHRXW¶,WLVZRUWKTXRWLQJH[WHQVLYHO\EHFDXVHLWH[HPSOL¿HV
almost all of the prescriptivist’s range of attitudes: 
This once useful and individual phrase has now, in familiar style, 
EHHQUHOHJDWHGWRWKHVWDWXVRIDGR]HQQHDUV\QRQ\PV1RZDGD\V
\RXHNHRXWDVXEVLVWHQFHE\VFUDWFKLQJDQGVFULPSLQJ>¿YHPRUH
QHDUV\QRQ\PVIROORZ@DQGVRRQ%XWLQWKHGD\VZKHQZRUGVPHDQW
what they said you eked out your dull diet with nasturtium leaves, 
or eked out your defective income [. . .] with other payments. Eke, 
then, was an archaic adverb meaning also and the verbal expression 
remembered that. [. . .] The objection to slipshod language is not its 
remissness, though there is that, as its effective elimination of useful 
expressions. As things now are, to refer to what used to be eking out 
you have to go into tedious Latin polysyllables about supplementing 
sources of resources.
$VVRRIWHQZLWKOLWHUDWXUHRIWKLVW\SHRQH¶V¿UVWUHDFWLRQLVWRZRQGHU
whether it is meant seriously. The last remark, in particular, is very patently 
open to objection: to substitute supplement for eke out is to add one unstressed 
syllable. Surprising also is the appeal to etymology, a fallacy long exploded in 
linguistics: to suggest that the language somehow ‘remembers’ or recalls the 
original meaning of eke is to violate one of the discipline’s basic principles. 
Amis is perhaps exploiting his status as an accomplished writer when he laments 
current linguistic degeneracy: ‘in the days when words meant what they said’ 
recalls Labov’s remarks about fondness for the past, and we may remark further 
that nostalgia in one of Amis’s generation (1922–95) is regret for a time when 
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WKHKLHUDUFKLFDOSULQFLSOHZHKDYHGLVFXVVHGKHUHZDVPRUH¿UPO\HVWDEOLVKHG
than it is now. 
V. Anti-prescriptivism
As is implicit in the foregoing discussion, ideologies offer competing 
world-views, a fact which means that the market place in ideas and attitudes is in 
DSHUSHWXDOVWDWHRIÀX[,Q:HVWHUQVRFLHWLHVWKHWZRPDLQRSSRVLQJLGHRORJLHV
RUDWOHDVWWKRVHWKDWPRVWFRQFHUQXVKHUHPLJKWEHGH¿QHGDVSURDQGDQWL
hierarchical, or elitist and egalitarian. Both views are rich in contradiction and 
fallacy, and each is partial, in both senses of the word: in taking into account 
only a selection of the facts, and in adopting a parti pris.
,QOLQJXLVWLFWHUPVWKHLGHRORJLFDOFRQÀLFWMXVWDOOXGHGWRLVH[SUHVVHGE\
means of a proxy war in which the standard language is seen as the preserve of 
the empowered, while those whose linguistic practice embodies a broadly ‘anti-
prescriptive’ stance are simultaneously courted by politicians and chastised for 
lacking ambition or, to use the term that is currently in vogue, aspiration. As a 
(language-facing) ideology, anti-prescriptivism has been salient in the UK since 
around 1945, although it was foreshadowed well before then, and it has received 
FRQVLGHUDEOHUHLQIRUFHPHQWIURPFXOWXUDOWUDI¿FZLWKWKH86$$Q\RQHZKRKDV
read a sample of British novels published in the late 1940s and early 1950s will 
have encountered references to ‘levelling down’, a process which in its linguistic 
manifestation is similar to dialect levelling but with a broadly non-standard 
output. Recognition of the phenomenon can be seen in the modern penchant 
for pseudo-working class linguistic features among politicians who wish to be 
seen as progressive. In the British General Election of 2015, for example, while 
the speech of the Conservative leader David Cameron adhered resolutely to the 
cut-glass phonology enshrined in so-called Received Pronunciation, the leader 
of the Labour Party, stemming himself from a privileged background, peppered 
KLVVSHHFKZLWKJORWWDOVWRSVVHPLYRFDOL]HG¿QDOODWHUDOVDQGRWKHUHPEOHPVRI
vernacular English.
,W LV GLI¿FXOW WR GHWHUPLQH ZKLFK RI WKHVH FRPSHWLQJ LGHRORJLHV LV
currently dominant, and in a sense the question is futile since neither the elitist 
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nor the egalitarian ideology enjoys total currency in any community. The two 
are moreover interlocked in that judgments on standard or non-standard types of 
behaviour are made with reference to a structured system that comprises both, 
and where, to use Meillet’s celebrated phrase (1903: 407), tout se tient.22 This 
is well illustrated by Honey’s example of southern Irish accents (1991: 131), of 
which he remarks: “standing outside the British social system, they are relatively 
FODVVOHVV´7KHUHPDUNQHHGVFRQVLGHUDEOHTXDOL¿FDWLRQEXWGRHVFRPHFORVHWR
capturing the general point just made: where an accent falls outside a structured 
system or frame of reference of the type described above, judgements in terms 
RIµVWDQGDUGYHUVXVQRQVWDQGDUG¶DUHGLI¿FXOWWRPDNH
 The interdependency of the two opposing viewpoints has in fact long 
occupied a position on the periphery of general recognition. For example, an 
oblique awareness of it is detectable in the following extract from C. S. Lewis’s 
Studies in wordsZKLFKZDV¿UVWSXEOLVKHGLQ
Words which originally referred to a person’s rank – to legal, social, 
RUHFRQRPLFVWDWXVDQGWKHTXDOL¿FDWLRQVRIELUWKZKLFKKDYHRIWHQ
been attached to these – have a tendency to become words which 
assign a type of character or behaviour. Those implying superior 
VWDWXVFDQEHFRPH WHUPVRISUDLVH WKRVH LPSO\LQJ LQIHULRUVWDWXV
terms of disapproval. Chivalrous, courteous, frank, generous, 
JHQWOHOLEHUDODQGQREOHDUHH[DPSOHVRIWKH¿UVWLJQREOHYLOODLQ
and vulgar, of the second.
Sometimes there are complexities. All my life the epithet bourgeois 
has been, in many contexts, a term of contempt, but not for the 
same reason. When I was a boy [. . .] it was applied to my social 
FODVV E\ WKH FODVV DERYH LW ERXUJHRLV PHDQW µQRW DULVWRFUDWLF
therefore vulgar’. When I was in my twenties this changed. My 
FODVV ZDV QRZ YLOL¿HG E\ WKH FODVV EHORZ LW ERXUJHRLV EHJDQ WR
PHDQµQRWSUROHWDULDQWKHUHIRUHSDUDVLWLFUHDFWLRQDU\¶>@:KHQ
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the bourgeoisie is despised for not being proletarian we get an 
exception to the general principle stated above. The name of the 
higher status implied the worse character and behaviour. This I take 
to be the peculiar, and transitory, result of a revolutionary situation. 
7KHHDUOLHUXVDJH±ERXUJHRLVDVµQRWDULVWRFUDWLF¶±LVWKHQRUPDO
linguistic phenomenon. (Lewis 1960: 21–22)
Lewis (1898–1963) is best known in scholarly circles as a specialist 
of medieval and renaissance literature, but he had philosophical training and 
Studies in words shows a respectable grasp of certain semantic principles – for 
instance, he evokes what he calls the drift from the descriptive to the evaluative 
use of a word. The concept is discussed more recently by Traugott (1989), 
who suggested that the fundamental tendency at the origin of all semantic (and 
therefore lexical) change is the shift from the objective to the subjective use of 
lexical items. We can assimilate this shift to the tendency to load emotion into 
one’s world-view; in other words, to adhere to an ideology. In the case of the 
epithet bourgeois, the mutually contradictory reactions to the term encapsulate 
neatly the uneasy equilibrium which exists between the elitist and egalitarian 
ideologies discussed here.
0RUH VLJQL¿FDQW SHUKDSV ZDV /HZLV¶V DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW ZKDW KH KDG
noticed was a passing phenomenon. He was writing when the youth movement 
in its various forms was gathering momentum; in popular music, for example, 
and in protest against the war in Vietnam. But he refers to his twenties, the 
time after the First World War when rebellion among the young against their 
elders was widespread; this attitude continued in various forms, and for different 
reasons, through the 1930s. Lewis’s assumption that the earlier usage is ‘the 
normal linguistic phenomenon’ deriving from the hierarchical point of view 
UHÀHFWVSHUKDSVKLVWHQGHQF\DVDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVDFODVVLFLVWWRWDNHWKHORQJ
view. Elsewhere in his writings Lewis (1961) asserts that this point of view was 
until quite recently continuous from antiquity, going back at least to Aristotle. 
From this perspective one can say that the hierarchical viewpoint is ‘normal’ in 
human society, in the statistical sense of having prevailed for the greater part of 
western recorded history. Certainly it is a measure of the rapidity and thorough-
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going nature of recent social change that this ancient way of looking at things, 
which prevailed for more than two millennia, should now appear so retrograde. 
Equally striking, however, is the vigour with which prescriptivism continues to 
EHSURPRWHG:KLOH$ULVWRWOH¶VYLHZE\PHDQVRIZKLFKKHMXVWL¿HVVODYHU\LV
now largely forgotten, or reviled if remembered (to the extent, as Lewis points 
out, that we are at risk of misunderstanding earlier literature by projecting onto it 
our contemporary assumptions), its secondary effects, including standardization, 
continue to be felt through what one might call a form of cultural inertia.
:HVKDOOQRWSXUVXHIXUWKHURXUUHÀHFWLRQVRQWKHHJDOLWDULDQYLHZSRLQW
EH\RQG UHLWHUDWLQJ WKDW LQ HVVHQFH LW LV LGHRORJLFDO DV GH¿QHG HDUOLHU 2QH
obvious difference between (normative) anti-prescriptivists and the efforts of 
the standardizers is that the latter have produced, and continue to produce, a 
large formal literature, in the shape of dictionaries and grammars, as well as 
works commenting on language more discursively, and more recently (and no 
doubt more effectively) computer spellcheckers and grammar checkers. We 
may however note in passing that the anti-prescriptive view at one time held 
VZD\DPRQJHGXFDWLRQLVWVZKRZHUHLQDSRVLWLRQWRLQÀXHQFHWKHSUDFWLFHRI
(QJOLVKWHDFKLQJDSROLF\WKDWGLGQRWQHFHVVDULO\EHQH¿WWKRVHLWZDVGHVLJQHG
to assist, given that the view is not widely shared by decision-makers. An oft-
cited example in this regard is that those in a position to offer employment to 
school leavers may favour those who exhibit an easy command of the standard 
language over those who retain their allegiance to regionally or socially marked 
linguistic patterns.
VI. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have attempted to distil the thematic continuity between 
earlier manifestations of the prescriptive approach to language use and the same 
approach in some of its contemporary forms. An aristocrat in ancient Rome was 
expected to master classical Latin and to use the variety in persuasive speech; 
this was in part a practical expectation, since forensic skills were necessary 
in the political career that ambitious Romans followed. Similarly, an aspiring 
bourgeois or member of the noblesse de robe in pre-Revolutionary France 
would be expected to mimic the language of the royal court, itself based on the 
usage of the best writers, an ability which again implied a mastery of the literary 
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standard. But these expectations have themselves a large arbitrary element, and 
the situations recall the contemporary use of the standard to compose public 
documents and also to maintain social distinctions. Viewed in this light, mastery 
of the standard is a social accomplishment, and its continued existence as a set 
of shibboleths remains useful to those who value it, while militating against 
the existence of diversity in language use. This is not to downplay the value of 
shibboleths as gate-keeping devices, and even though shibboleths are no longer 
a matter of life and death,23 prescriptivists continue to employ them as a handy 
VRFLDO¿OWHUHYHQWKRXJKWKH\PD\DIIHFWWRGHSORUHWKHLUXVH1HYHUWKHOHVVLQ
WKHXUFRQÀLFWWKDWSLWVWKHVWDQGDUGL]HGXWRSLDVRXJKWE\SUHVFULSWLYLVPDJDLQVW
the centrifugal forces generated by the population at large, the triumph of the 
standard ideology is by no means assured.
Notes
1 “This study, inaugurated by the Greeks and continued mainly by the French, is 
EDVHGRQORJLFDQGODFNVDQ\VFLHQWL¿FRUGLVLQWHUHVWHGYLHZRIODQJXDJHLWVHOI
it aims solely at giving rules to distinguish correct forms from incorrect ones; 
it is a normative discipline, greatly removed from pure observation and with a 
necessarily narrow focus.”
2  This moralistic approach is apparent among certain 19th century English 
commentators, for example. Milroy (2001: 550) cites George Marsh, who in 
his Lectures on the English language (1865) argued that ‘moral obliquity’ often 
underlay linguistic innovation and that ‘to pillory such offences’ was ‘the sacred 
duty of every scholar’.
 3 “A certain discipline is appropriate to speakers and writers alike. Language 
depends on reason, the sanction of antiquity, authority and usage. Reason is 
manifested primarily in analogy and sometimes in etymology. Antiquity is 
recommended by a certain majesty and, to put it this way, purity. Authority is 
usually sought in orators and historians. However, usage is the surest guide for 
speaking and we should clearly treat language as we would a currency, which 
bears a public stamp.”
_______________________
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 4 ³,QVSHHFKLIVRPHWKLQJKDVLQFRUUHFWO\EHFRPH¿[HGDPRQJWKHPDQ\LWVKRXOG
not be accepted as a rule of language. For, passing over the way the uneducated 
generally talk, we all know that whole theatres and the entire crowd at the circus 
RIWHQFU\RXWXVLQJLQFRUUHFWODQJXDJH,ZLOOWKHUHIRUHGH¿QHXVDJHLQVSHHFKDV
the consensus of the erudite, just as usage in the art of living is the consensus of 
the good.”
 5 “When in Salamanca I showed a sample of this work to your majesty and you 
asked me what it could be used for [. . .]”
6 “And one of two things will happen: either the memory of your deeds will die 
with the language or it will wander among foreign nations, lacking its own home 
LQZKLFKWRUHVLGH,QWKHIRXQGDWLRQRIWKHODWWHU,KDYHWULHGWROD\WKH¿UVWVWRQH
and to do in our language what Zenodotus did in Greek and Crates in Latin. 
Although these were surpassed by those who wrote after them, at least they, like 
XVPDQDJHGWREHWKH¿UVWLQYHQWRUVRIVXFKDQHFHVVDU\ZRUNVRPHWKLQJZKLFK
we carried out at the most opportune moment there has ever been, because our 
language has now attained such a zenith that one should rather fear its descent 
than expect its improvement.”
 7 An analogous concern with functionality is evident in the ‘utilitarian’ approach 
to standardization, which became fashionable during the Enlightenment. A good 
example of this approach is Swift’s Proposal for Correcting, Improving and 
Ascertaining the English Language (1712), which called for a government-
sponsored programme to crystallize the English language in a permanent, 
invariant form.
8 “My purpose in this work is to condemn everything that does not belong to 
correct and elegant usage.”
9 For example, the notion of le bon usage invoked by Vaugelas persists to the 
present day, most notably by supplying the title of the most widely consulted 
normative grammar of modern French (see Grevisse, 1986).
10 “The way the best part of the Court speaks.”
11 “Let it not be thought that my purpose is to call everything that is peculiar to 
Latin Americans vicious and corrupt.”
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 12  “The grammar of a language is the art of speaking correctly, that is, in a way 
that is consonant with correct usage, which is that of educated people. This usage 
is preferred because it is the most uniform in the various provinces and towns 
that speak a particular language  [. . .] whereas the words and phrases of ignorant 
people vary greatly from some towns and provinces to others, and they are not 
easily understood outside of the narrow area in which they are commonly used.”
 13  “The biggest problem, and the one which, if it is not kept in check, will 
GHSULYHXVRIWKHLQHVWLPDEOHDGYDQWDJHVRIDFRPPRQODQJXDJHLVWKHLQÀX[RI
constructional innovations, which inundates and clouds much of what is written 
in Latin America, and which, by altering the structure of the language, threatens 
to change it into a plethora of irregular, ill-disciplined and barbarous dialects, 
the germs of future languages which over time will reproduce in America what 
happened to Europe in the dark period in which Latin was corrupted [. . .] 
Perhaps I exaggerate the danger, but it is the principal motive that induced me 
to compose this work.”
 14  “To describe and trace the history of all languages to which it [linguistics] can 
be applied.”
 15 “To identify the forces that are at work in a permanent and universal way in 
all languages.”
16  ³7KH VXEMHFW PDWWHU RI OLQJXLVWLFV FRPSULVHV ¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW DOO
manifestations of human language, not just correct language and “elegant 
usage”, but all forms of expression.”
 17  “Generative Grammar, which addresses problems of increasing delicacy and 
complexity, has recourse to ever more subtle judgments, about which subjects 
hesitate and contradict themselves etc. The risk of arbitrariness becomes great. 
Put another way, and above all when the problems studied are at the margins 
of syntax and of semantics, even pragmatics, crude judgments mean very little: 
they require interpretation . . . Perhaps a question arises, which our linguists, 
good democrats that they are, prefer not to address: could there be degrees of 
linguistic competence? Could certain subjects have more of a talent than others 
for exploiting the latent possibilities of the system? . . . perhaps traditional 
grammar was not completely wrong to privilege the best writers.”
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18  6\QHFGRFKHLWVHOILVDVXEW\SHRIPHWRQ\P\VSHFL¿FDOO\RQHLQZKLFKDSDUW
of an entity is used to represent the whole.
 19  An adherence to an ideology does not however rule out all insight into its 
possession. This is apparent from the fact that speakers are quite capable of 
prefacing a contentious remark with ‘call me old-fashioned, but . . .’ or something 
similar.
 20  “What is not clear is not French.”
 21  “What is not clear is still English, Italian, Greek or Latin.”
 22  “Everything is interconnected.”
 23  But note in this connection the 1937 ‘Parsley Massacre’ in the Dominican 
Republic, which reputedly turned on a difference of pronunciation of the Spanish 
word perejil.
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